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The People’s Game and the People’s War: Football, 
Class and Nation in Wartime Britain, 1939-1945 
Matthew Taylor  
Abstract: »Volkssport und Volkskrieg: Fußball, Klasse und Nation in Großbri-
tannien während des Zweiten Weltkrieges«. The image of World War Two as a 
‘people’s war,’ during which a new sense of British national identity was forged, 
has initiated considerable scholarly inquiry in recent years. Some have argued 
for a remaking of Britishness during the war, seeing it as period when popular 
consciousness of the ‘national’ was enhanced and notions of communal and 
collective identities increasingly articulated. Others have outlined the limita-
tions of the ‘people’s war’ rhetoric, flagging up the tensions, divisions and so-
cial distinctions which continually threatened to destabilise the government’s 
call to unity. This article breaks new ground in arguing that football became a 
key emblem both of the people and the nation in wartime Britain. Valued as a 
source of home front morale, and a means of keeping war workers fit and 
healthy, the game was also increasingly recognised as central to ordinary Brit-
ish life; part of the routine and rhythm of the everyday. However, as an em-
blem of the ‘nation,’ and competing ideas of what constituted it, the ‘people’s 
game’ was also a site for expressions of disunity, division and dissatisfaction. 
Drawing on a mixture of official archives and private collections, as well as on 
representations in the popular press and on the radio, this article explores three 
main areas: the relationship between the wartime government and the game; 
the connections made between football and class identity; and the interaction 
between nation and region in the treatment and representation of football. 
Keywords: Second World War, class, nation, Britishness, football, identity, morale. 
1.  Introduction 
On 17 January 1942, Maurice Cranston, a young volunteer for the social re-
search organisation Mass-Observation and a future philosopher, attended the 
England-Scotland football international at Wembley Stadium. In his account of 
the match, he made no mention of the play itself or the score (it ended 3-0 to 
England) but focused on the mood and behaviour of the crowd. ‘When the 
game began,’ he commented: 
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I was surprised by the all round enthusiasm. I have been to other football 
matches but never have I seen Englishmen throw themselves into the game so 
much. They seemed determined to forget all else… At times it was almost 
hysterical. Whether they were cheering wildly or oh-ing with disappointment 
it really made no difference.  
Significantly, he noted that on the way out of the stadium members of the 
crowd talked ‘wistfully’ of ‘how nice it used to be before the war when […] after 
tea on a Saturday they could sit down and listen to the football results and check 
their coupons.’1 Here was a snapshot of football as a passion and a form of escape 
but also as representative of the ordinary, the everyday, of belonging and home; a 
sport woven into the cultural fabric of English, and possibly British, life.  
Football was branded ‘the people’s game’ by its first academic historian 
(Walvin 1975). The notion of ‘the people’ has been much debated in British 
social history since then. Patrick Joyce famously advocated its adoption as a 
more accurate and universalising alternative to ‘class.’ When social identity 
seemed, in practice, to be connected more to broader conceptions of ‘the peo-
ple’ than the narrow language of class, Joyce argued, ‘the value of applying the 
class label’ became ‘open to doubt’ (Joyce 1991, 332). In both contemporary and 
academic usage, however, the terms have overlapped and football has been des-
ignated as a/the game of the ‘people,’ the ‘masses,’ the ‘lower ranks,’ or ‘working 
class’ or ‘classes’ interchangeably. In addition, football has enjoyed a parallel, 
often intertwining, existence as a ‘national’ sport, a cultural form popular and 
meaningful enough to be considered a vital ingredient of what has ‘made’ Brit-
ain and the British; though one which also could contradictorily emblemise and 
define the national identities of the English, Scottish, Welsh and Irish. 
Scholars have been far from precise concerning when and where identities 
of ‘nation’ first coalesced around football. Most existing treatments of the 
game’s cultural and social status in the mid-twentieth century have been inex-
plicit on the question and chronologically static. Ross McKibbin categorised 
football between 1918 and 1951 as a ‘national sport,’ that is, a sport ‘broadly 
representative of society as a whole’; not as ‘national’ as cricket, perhaps, but ‘the 
country’s greatest sport,’ by which he presumably meant the most popular 
(McKibbin 1998, 331, 339). In their study of post-war British sport, Richard Holt 
and Tony Mason saw the early 1950s as the turning point: the moment when 
professional football ‘ceased to be the preserve of the working class and came to 
be recognised as the equal of cricket as part of English national culture’ (Holt and 
Mason 2000, 97, my emphasis). This article challenges these views, and the fixed 
and unitary conception of identity that they promote. It does so by focusing on 
the Second World War, a time when identities of various kinds interacted with 
one another, and when the interplay between notions of nation and class were 
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particularly exposed. It demonstrates that far from signifying an interlude in the 
social and cultural history of the game, the war accelerated football’s emer-
gence as the recognised national sport of working-class Britain. 
All writing on the Second World War has had to contend with the contem-
porary image of a ‘people’s war’ during which a new sense of national identity 
was forged. The war, it has been argued, held ‘a central place in the British 
national narrative,’ creating and sustaining the notion of a united national 
community, and reinforcing ‘ideas of Britishness defined against enemies both 
abroad and at home’ (Ugolini and Pattinson 2015, 6). The result of this was, in 
the view of a leading historian of national identity, a remaking of Britishness 
during the 1940s, a period in which ‘the idea of the nation [became] more 
closely synonymous with that of the people’ (Weight 2002, 208). Without 
doubt, the Second World War was a period when the popular consciousness of 
the ‘national’ was enhanced and notions of its communal and collective dimen-
sions were increasingly articulated and imagined. However, the intensified 
awareness of a nation united through war simultaneously prompted ‘a thorough 
examination of what constituted British national identity’ (Weight and Beach 
1998, 8). For Sonya Rose, the centrality of national identity in people’s lives 
produced ‘the possibility for the kinds of conflicts that […] came to be known 
as “identity politics.”’ The ‘pull to unity,’ she has argued, ‘was accompanied 
by the pull to resist that incorporation in the name of particularity, difference or 
group distinctiveness’ (Rose 2003, 7-8). Wartime national identity, in this 
view, was cross-cut by divisions based on gender, geography, race and social 
class. It was not one thing but many; a plural, not a unitary, phenomenon. 
That wartime understandings of Britishness were neither monolithic nor 
necessarily coherent has been well established in a series of recent studies. 
Geoffrey Field has argued that the Second World War ‘deepened’ class identity 
and ‘reshaped class relations’ in ‘important ways,’ effectively nationalising 
workers by forging a new shared class consciousness and a common political 
agenda. Yet he also recognised that a popular working-class unity could co-
exist with strong expressions of national identity and belonging, partly because 
the ambiguity of slogans such as the ‘people’s war’ allowed for the existence of 
contradictions and a variety of contesting interpretations of what it meant to be 
British (Field 2011, 6, 377). Regional and sub-national identities could likewise 
flourish in the context of a pluralised and inclusive Britishness. Scottish and 
Welsh people lived with, and often thought through, the complexities of na-
tionality, certainly more than the English, and this was no different in wartime. 
Welshness, it has been argued, was ‘neither lost nor subsumed’ during the 
wartime peak of Britishness; rather, despite closer contact with England and 
commitment to an overarching British cause, Welsh self-identity was sharp-
ened by war, ‘particularly amongst those for whom it was generally a rather 
unfocused and diffuse feeling’ (Johnes 2015, 67-8).  
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British identity was at its most powerful, others have contended, when it 
was at its most generalised, when Britishness conjured up broad notions of 
‘sameness’ and ‘belonging’ rather than sharply defined interpretations of what 
the nation stood for and what it meant. This was most clearly expressed in the 
ordinary routine and minutiae of life – ‘in the daily lives of the people, in their 
shared experience and familiar surroundings.’ The ‘sameness’ that defined 
British national identity was ‘evoked in innumerable wartime celebrations of 
familiar British things,’ as John Baxendale has argued, or in the everyday 
‘flagging’ of the nation encapsulated in Michael Billig’s concept of ‘banal 
nationalism’ (Baxendale 1999, 300; Billig 1995).  
One of the most significant and ubiquitous cultural phenomena of the peri-
od, football has rarely been called into service by historians to test these as-
sumptions. However, this article approaches the game as an important cultural 
space where understandings of national character and identity politics were 
debated. It breaks new ground in arguing that football became a key emblem 
both of the people and the nation in wartime Britain. The convergence of these 
two conceptions was important, as the values ascribed to football in wartime as a 
practical means of relaxation and rejuvenation and a symbol of normality, of 
everyday life, were one element which helped tie them together. Valued as a 
source of home front morale, and a means of keeping war workers fit and 
healthy, the game was increasingly seen as central to ordinary British life; part of 
the routine and rhythm of the everyday. However, as an emblem of the ‘nation,’ 
and ideas of what constituted it, the so-called ‘people’s game’ was also a site for 
expressions of disunity, division and dissatisfaction; a location where concerns 
about social and economic inequalities were articulated. Football certainly came 
to symbolise the nation, as one of a number of commonplace cultures that 
linked the Britain of war and pre-war. Yet football’s ‘nation’ was often exclu-
sive and contained: industrial, male and working class. The game could and did 
stand for Britishness but the Britain it stood for was acknowledged as particular 
and distinct, some way from the unified nation of wartime mythology.  
This article has four sections. The first of these contextualises the subsequent 
discussion by examining how the government and other politicians regarded the 
playing of football in wartime, and the relationships that developed between the 
state and the game’s authorities over the course of the conflict. The second sec-
tion shifts to consider popular attitudes to football, focusing particularly on how 
the game was inflected with specific class connotations by those who claimed to 
have little interest in it, such as respondents to the social organisation Mass-
Observation’s periodic directives. The third section centres on the perpetuation of 
regional and sub-national identities in wartime football, arguing that these did not 
necessarily conflict with the symbolic value of the game as representative of the 
British collectively. In the final part, football’s potential as an outlet for the 
expression of pre-war memories and popular nostalgia are explored, with par-
ticular reference to the narratives of BBC radio and newspaper coverage. 
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2.  The Wartime Government and Football 
As in many arenas of political and cultural life, the British government’s atti-
tude to sport in general, and football in particular, was shaped by the experi-
ences of the 1914-18 conflict. The reaction to the outbreak of war in August 
1914 among governing bodies had been complicated, varying from sport to sport, 
but determined most of all by financial considerations. Most amateur bodies and 
clubs, in sports such as golf, hockey, lawn tennis and rugby union, had suspended 
fixtures and dedicated their resources and manpower to the war effort. Commer-
cialised sports such as cricket, horse racing, football and rugby league, by con-
trast, generally opted to carry on (Veitch 1981; Taylor 2001; Collins 2006; John 
2013). In common with entertainments like the theatre and music hall, they em-
ployed professional staff and were run as businesses, and so could not afford to 
stop unless compelled to do so. The government, for its part, advised and negoti-
ated but did not force the football authorities to take a particular course of action. 
The War Office had originally left the decision of whether to continue playing 
or not at the discretion of the national Football Associations (FA). Within a few 
months, it was privately pressing the FAs to suspend cup competitions and 
international matches in order ‘to satisfy public sentiment.’2 They agreed to 
cancel internationals but maintained that they could help the war effort more 
‘by continuing the matches than by stopping them.’3 Eventually the decision 
was made at the end of the 1914/15 season to suspend the normal league and 
cup competitions in England and Wales in favour of a regional programme of 
matches. But even then, government pressure had been a less significant factor 
than players joining the armed forces or taking up war work, the difficulties of 
travel restrictions and the financial strain on the professional clubs.4  
The football authorities had less room for manoeuvre in 1939. The per-
ceived risk of air attack led the government to close all places of entertainment 
and outdoor sports meetings when war was announced on 3 September. This 
was accepted without criticism by the game’s authorities, as was the subse-
quent relaxation of the ban which allowed friendly matches and competitive 
fixtures to be played between ‘local and district groups of clubs’ and limited 
attendances according to area.5 The details of these restrictions, and the way 
they were to be carried out, however, demonstrated the close relationships that 
were established between football’s controlling bodies and government de-
partments from the early stages of the war. Wider security policies were signif-
icantly shaped by negotiation. For instance, the differential treatment of estab-
                                                             
2  The War and Football, Further Report of the FA Sub-Committee (7 December 1914), Football 
Association Archives (FAA), Wembley Stadium, London. 
3  The War and Football, FA Circular (5 December 1914), FAA. 
4  Athletic News (26 July 1915). 
5  Football in Time of War, FA Memo No. 3 (21 September 1939), FAA. 
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lishments in evacuation areas considered most vulnerable to air attack, on one 
hand, and the reception and neutral areas assumed to be safer, on the other, was 
in line with general policy. But the precise limitations placed on the size of 
crowds emerged as a result of consultation between the Home Office, the Min-
istry of Information, local police, and the associations and leagues. A low max-
imum of between 2,000 and 5,000 in evacuation areas, which government 
officials preferred, was pushed up in discussion with the FA, the Scottish FA 
and the Football League, which ran the elite professional game. FA secretary 
Stanley Rous argued that a higher limit of 8,000 would ‘just make the differ-
ence between games at a loss and games with their overheads paid.’6 The 
Home Office’s plan to require advance ticket booking for all matches as a 
means of keeping crowds low was abandoned when clubs protested that it was 
unworkable, and police chiefs and Regional Information Officers, on the basis 
of the first wartime games, reported it to be unnecessary.7 By October 1939, 
booking for matches at larger grounds with a capacity over 60,000, where a 
15,000 maximum was imposed, was also relaxed, based on the infrequency of 
larger crowds under wartime conditions and to bring the whole country in line 
with cities like Glasgow, where the Chief Constable had already been given 
discretion to dispense with ticketing.8  
Discussions over whether or not football should continue, and if so in what 
form, were wrapped up in broader debates concerning civilian morale. A cen-
tral issue for historians of wartime Britain, studies of morale have nonetheless 
seriously underestimated the role of football, alongside other sports and enter-
tainments, as a key part in the government’s strategy of ‘promoting well-being 
through recreation and leisure.’ Broadly speaking, it is true to say that the gov-
ernment recognised what Robert Mackay has called ‘the therapeutic value’ of 
playing, watching, reading and listening about, and betting on football ‘for a 
hard-worked, overstrained and war-weary civilian population’ (Mackay 2002, 
209). If officials had been unsure how much the game mattered to some sec-
tions of the community, its initial prohibition and subsequent partial rehabilita-
tion had probably brought this home. The local press generally welcomed the 
end of the Home Office ban. The Leicester Mercury considered the return of 
public football to be ‘a case of trusting the people’ and ensuring that their ‘spir-
                                                             
6  Football in Time of War, Football League Memo, undated [September 1939], Lancashire 
Archives (LA), Football League Collection (FLC), DDFOL/1/1/2/3; Sir Alexander Maxwell Memo 
(19 September 1939), The National Archives (TNA), London, HO 186/2082.  
7  Maxwell to Stanley Rous, draft letter, undated [September 1939]; F. S. James, Chief Consta-
ble of Sheffield, to Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (28 September 1939); John Hilton 
to Sir Wilfred Eady (26 September 1939), TNA, HO 186/2082.  
8  P. J. Sillitoe, City of Glasgow Police to W. Lewis, Scottish Home Office (25 September 1939); 
ARB to W. Lewis (28 September 1939); Circular letter to Chief Constables from F. C. Johnson 
(10 October 1939), TNA, HO 186/2082. 
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it’ was sustained ‘in its healthiest form.’9 An editorial in the Staffordshire 
Evening Sentinel argued that along with cinemas and theatres, football was the 
key to maintaining ‘the splendid morale, good spirits and confidence of the 
people.’10 Mass-Observation took a similar view, but it was more critical than 
most newspaper editors of the initial ban and the game’s subsequent organisation. 
A file report on ‘War-Time Sport’ from January 1940 contended that football’s 
‘lack of connection […] with officialdom’ and the idea that it was primarily an 
entertainment ‘to be sacrificed in an emergency’ led to its temporary ‘death’ at 
the outbreak of war.11 An earlier report had highlighted football’s positive effect 
‘on the morale of the people,’ and argued for first-class sportsmen to be regard-
ed as equally ‘important to the community’ as watchmakers and curates, both 
reserved professions.12 Observations of matches themselves in the early months 
of war drew mixed conclusions but the organisation itself tended to pick out 
those that highlighted the apathy and passivity of the crowd. It blamed the FA 
and the Home Office restrictions, in particular, for producing uncompetitive 
football and offering little to spark enthusiasm ‘in the minds of the many peo-
ple who found football a dynamic, energetic force and interest in their lives.’13  
Mackay has shown that perceptions of morale were not fixed; they altered 
according to the progress of the war and the changing pressures this entailed 
(Mackay 2002, 45). While this was certainly true in relation to spectator sport 
in general, the role of football as relaxant and morale-lifter was rarely ques-
tioned. Angus Calder noted that ‘almost no one had anything to say against 
soccer’ during wartime, and this was particularly evident in the government 
and the House of Commons (Calder 1992, 374-5). Ministers needed little con-
vincing that football had ‘a beneficial effect on public morale,’ even if they 
were less sure that some of its appendages, like pools gambling, should be 
encouraged.14 This position was maintained throughout the crisis precipitated 
by the fall of France in June 1940 and the blitz from September 1940 to May 
1941. Indeed, if anything the importance of football and other sports was rein-
forced as a result of a lengthy inter-departmental discussion in the summer of 
1940 of the role to be played by the government in fighting ‘boredom and loss 
of morale’ among the civilian population and the troops during the approaching 
winter. For Major Boyle of the Air Ministry, it was crucial that the government 
should encourage ‘the reintroduction of normal life […] the life by which the 
average man-in-the-street lives and moves and has his being’ – including foot-
ball and others sports ‘in reasonable quantities’ – as soon as possible.15 Sir 
                                                             
9  Leicester Mercury (9 September 1939). 
10  Staffordshire Evening Sentinel (11 September 1939). 
11  War-Time Sport: A Structural Analysis, File Report (FR) 18 (14 January 1940), 1-2, M-O A.  
12  Sport, FR 13 (13 December 1939), 6, M-O A. 
13  Ibid., 12-13, 6. 
14  John Hilton to Sir Wilfred Eady (23 September 1939), TNA, HO 186/2082. 
15  Major Boyle to Miss S. Griffith (31 July 1940), TNA, INF 1/260. 
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Kenneth Clark, Director of the National Gallery, advised that it was crucial for 
the government to make sure ‘decent people’ did not feel ashamed of ‘taking 
advantage of whatever entertainments are offered.’ He was concerned that the 
closing down of entertainment and sport at the beginning of the war had en-
couraged this feeling, and that the government should officially announce that 
it was their policy ‘to let people enjoy themselves as far as possible.’16 
Spectator sport faced its greatest challenge in February and March 1942, 
when in the context of a press campaign headed by the Daily Express against 
sporting events and those who wasted precious time and resources attending 
them, Lord President and Leader of the House Stafford Cripps proclaimed 
some sports to be ‘completely out of accord with the true determination of the 
people.’17 Significantly, however, his target was not football but greyhound 
racing and boxing. Indeed throughout the war football was particularly fa-
voured in official circles. It was rarely subjected to the degree of criticism 
frequently levelled at the other two major spectator sports at the time, dog 
racing and horse racing.18 In defending it against increases in entertainment tax, 
wartime advocates at Westminster emphasised football’s status as a ‘national’ 
game but one which was clearly ascribed to particular social groups. For West 
Bromwich MP John Dugden, football played a considerable role, alongside 
cricket, ‘in our national life’: the fact that people could go to games ‘to relax 
when they come out of factories’ helped to ‘keep up the nation’s morale.’ Mid-
dlesbrough East MP A. Edwards, considered football ‘a great national game 
which most industrial centres in the country at any rate greatly appreciate,’ and 
one which should therefore be protected and preserved by the government.19 
Similar sentiments were expressed in another debate over entertainment tax 
shortly after the war had ended. MPs argued that in increasing entertainment 
duty on football and other sports ‘we are penalising the recreation of the ordi-
nary working man’ and attacking ‘one of the necessities of the people.’ Lieut.-
Commander Braithwaite saw the game as an unequivocal force of social unity: 
‘a cement which enables us to be a nation in times of stress.’20 
As the war progressed, the government’s relations with the football authori-
ties were channelled through three main issues: the organisation of competi-
tion; safety restrictions; and travel restrictions. The move from nationally-
structured to regional competition was the most controversial element of elite 
football’s revised wartime schedule. In England and Wales, the Football 
League separated its clubs in October 1939 into eight regional groupings of 
                                                             
16  Minute, Sir Kenneth Clark to the Minister (22 August 1940), TNA, INF 1/260. 
17  House of Commons Debates (HC Deb) (25 February 1942), vol 378, cc314.  
18  On greyhound racing and horse racing, see TNA, HO 186/739, HO 186/740, HO 186/2080 
and HO 186/2081.  
19  HC Deb (2 June 1943), vol 390, cc229-43. 
20  HC Deb (29 November 1945), vol 416, cc1550-79.  
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between eight and twelve.21 The Scottish Football League organised a western 
and eastern division. Neither arrangement proved successful. Interest in match-
es which often pitted unequal teams against one another proved limited and 
gates were poor.22 The secretary of the Scottish FA successfully appealed to the 
Home Office to be permitted to organise an Emergency Cup Competition on a 
national basis in 1940 as some of its clubs ‘were in grave danger of having to 
close down entirely.’23 Yet while they were widely considered to have been a 
‘failure’ by the clubs, regionalised competitions remained in one form or an-
other throughout the conflict.24 The Football League was split into a large 
northern and a much smaller southern section, with the former sub-divided into 
lesser areas (Midlands, Lancashire, Yorkshire and North East). A small western 
section (incorporating clubs from Bath, Bristol and south Wales) was also 
introduced for the 1942/43 season. In Scotland, a Southern League and, from 
1941/42, a North-Eastern League, operated for the rest of the war (Inglis 1988, 
167; Crampsey 1990, 105-28). Each season, the football associations and 
leagues presented their proposals for Home Office approval, framed with 
broader wartime limitations in mind. Thus for 1942/43, by which time transport 
difficulties were becoming acute, the Football League based its proposals ‘on 
the principle of the maximum entertainment with the minimum travel,’ and the 
Scottish FA summarised the journeys of the participant teams and committed 
itself to further limiting travel ‘if the Ministry so desire.’25  
The safety of crowds at football matches remained a central consideration 
throughout the war. Initial attendance restrictions were set cautiously on the 
basis, as we have seen, of the likelihood of air attack, factored together with 
ground capacity. The Home Office also maintained a detailed record of air raid 
shelter facilities on football grounds and close by, as well as monitoring attend-
ance to ensure that it kept within the prescribed limits.26 But here too, the gov-
ernment was open to negotiation and modified its policy if it could be con-
vinced of the rationale for so doing. One instance in which this did occur was 
over the procedure when an air raid siren was heard during play. In the summer 
of 1940, the government opted to encourage work to continue after the alert 
                                                             
21  Minutes of Football League Management Committee (2 October 1939), LA, FLC, 
DDFOL/1/1/2/3. 
22  See typescript description of football match (Arsenal v Crystal Palace at White Hart Lane) (4 
November 1939); Typescript interview with Mr Ted Vizard (16 November 1939), M-O A, TC, 
82/2/E. 
23  George Graham to Sir Wilfred Eady (15 January 1940), TNA, HO 186/2082. 
24  Report of Special General Meeting of Members of the Football League (1 March 1940); 
Minutes of Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders of the Football League (29 July 1940), 
LA, FLC, DDFOL/1/1/2/3.  
25  Football League, Notes for Meeting, undated [May 1942]; Scottish FA, Memo for meeting at 
Home Office, 8 May 1942, TNA, HO 186/2082. 
26  Table on Limitation of Spectators, undated [April 1940]; Table of London Grounds and 
Facilities, undated [1940], TNA, HO 186/2082. 
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had been sounded, so as not to affect war production. This practice soon be-
came common in other leisure activities but it was initially not permitted at 
sports events. The FA lobbied vigorously to be ‘placed on the same footing as 
theatres, cinemas and other entertainments’ and complained that clubs in Lon-
don, especially, where Saturday air raids were frequent, faced ‘a financial cri-
sis.’27 The government eventually relented and allowed play to continue after 
the alert, providing cover for the crowd on the ground was sufficient and a roof 
spotter was in place.28 More generally, associations were normally successful in 
negotiating higher attendance limits for international matches or representative 
games, and for some local club derbies. Discretion was also applied to Chief 
Constables to set their own limits, especially in Scotland where the threat of 
bombing was considerably lower than in England.29 The government did agree 
in September 1943 to increase the attendance limit to 40,000 in all areas except 
the southern and eastern coastal regions of England, reflecting the reduced risk 
of air attack. But significantly, this policy change was not advertised to the 
public, for fear that publicity might encourage the higher attendances that other 
government departments such as the Ministry of War Transport (MoWT) were 
still determined to avoid.30  
By late 1941, transport had replaced safety as the main rationale for contin-
ued constraints on crowd sizes and competition structures. It was the MoWT 
which stood in the way of an FA proposal to allow a crowd limit of half the 
ground capacity in all parts of Britain in the summer of 1941. Ministry of 
Home Security (MoHS) officials were not convinced by the transport authori-
ties’ concern that attendances would rise if ‘the atmosphere of discouragement 
is removed,’ but decided that there was ultimately ‘little point in making any 
change.’31 The MoWT expressed little sympathy, too, when the Football 
League complained in December 1941 that travel restrictions were ‘jeopardis-
ing the whole competition.’ As many long distance trains had been withdrawn, 
the League requested that its clubs should be permitted greater freedom to 
travel by road. But R. H. Hill of the MoWT considered such exceptional 
measures not justified, reminded the League’s representatives that drivers and 
buses were in short supply and asked that they consider the effect on attitudes 
                                                             
27  Memo from Stanley Rous and the FA (15 November 1940), TNA, HO 186/2082. 
28  Home Security Circular No. 288/1940, Open-Air Entertainments: Air Raid Warnings (5 
December 1940), TNA, HO 186/2082. 
29  J.F.C. Carter Memo (5 December 1939); Metropolitan Police Memo (21 January 1940), TNA, 
MEPO 2/3488; W. Lewis to J.D.V. Hodge, 22 July 1941, TNA, HO 186/2082. See also TNA, 
MEPO 2/7775, Wembley Football Cup Finals, 1941-1946. 
30  War Cabinet, Civil Defence Committee, Note by the Hone Secretary and Minister of Home 
Security (9 September 1943); A.W. Peterson Minute (3 November 1943); Minute (12 No-
vember 1943), TNA, HO 186/2082.  
31  Ministry of War Transport to A. J. Lenfestey (11 September 1941); Minute (12 September 
1941), TNA, HO 186/2082.  
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in the USA, where petrol had been rationed to send to the UK, if it became 
known that this ‘was being used to convey football teams.’ In response to the 
League’s concerns that clubs in the north-east of England had to travel to play 
matches in Leeds, Huddersfield, Bradford and York in order to carry on, Hill 
opined that it was probably ‘necessary for isolated teams to cease playing for 
the duration.’32 Amateur clubs were allowed to travel distances by road of 25 
miles, but complaints such as those in February 1942 that ‘lack of conveyance’ 
made it difficult to transport teams and so to keep football ‘alive’ in the Lan-
arkshire villages, were frequently reported in the local press.33  
The transport authorities had to strike a balance between supporting football 
as ‘a desirable form of recreation’ and protecting war production.34 It also 
needed to factor in the sensibilities of those with little interest in the game. 
Home Intelligence reports showed that the transport problems of war workers 
were a consistent cause of public complaint.35 The MoWT frequently asserted 
its policy that no additional rail or road facilities should be made available for 
football matches. But in practice it was often necessary to put on additional 
trains so that war work and freight traffic were not unduly affected. Hence an 
extra twelve trains were utilised to carry an expected 10,000 spectators from 
Portsmouth to Wembley for the 1942 London Cup final.36 
3.  Which People’s Game? 
By the beginning of the Second World War, football was the most popular 
game in Britain on almost any quantifiable measure. But it was not considered 
a sport for all. It remained, as Andrew August has commented, ‘the quintessen-
tial working-class sport, for boys and young men as players, for younger and 
older men as spectators, and for all who participated in the pools.’ Unlike 
cricket, which despite entrenched class differences, had developed a powerful 
image as a ‘national’ sport, with an ability to appeal ‘across class lines,’ those 
who followed and watched football in the 1930s remained ‘overwhelmingly 
working class’ (August 2007, 216-7). The football grounds of England, Nicho-
las Fishwick concluded in his study of the social history of the game before 
1950, were akin to ‘the Labour Party at prayer’ (Fishwick 1989, 150). 
                                                             
32  Minutes of Football League Management Committee, Report of Interview with Ministry of 
War Transport (3 December 1941), FAA. 
33  Motherwell Times, 13 February 1942. 
34  Minutes of Football League Management Committee, Report of Interview with Ministry of 
War Transport (3 December 1941), FAA. 
35  War Cabinet, State of Home Morale during the period ending 27 April 1942, Ministry of 
Information Draft, undated [April 1942], TNA, INF 1/284. 
36  Extract from Minutes of Railway Executive Committee (12 May 1942); CR Min, 563, Train 
Services for Sporting Events other than Race Meetings (12 May 1942), TNA, AN 2/866.  
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This section explores popular attitudes to football in wartime by looking at 
how the game was represented by Mass-Observation, in terms of its observers 
and its volunteer panel. Mass-Observation was founded in 1937 by Tom Har-
risson, Charles Madge and Humphrey Jennings. It was, as Penny Summerfield 
has observed, both a social survey organisation and a social movement, dedi-
cated to documenting elements of everyday life and culture normally ignored 
or taken for granted as well as charting the changing popular moods of the 
people (Summerfield 1985). It sought to supply ‘an anthropology and a mass-
documentation for a vast sector of normal life’ not adequately reflected by the 
media, the arts, political leaders, and others (Harrisson 1976, 11). To do this, it 
recruited a ‘National Panel’ of observers who were asked to respond in writing 
to periodic ‘directives’; many also kept written diaries. This worked alongside 
the ethnographic methodology employed as part of the ‘Worktown’ strand of 
the organisation, whereby the people of Bolton were ‘observed’ in their every-
day lives, shopping, visiting the pub, dancing and socialising, going on holiday, 
watching sport, and so on. The war ‘diverted’ Mass-Observation’s work but it 
maintained its nationwide panel and teams of trained observers to supply mate-
rial on a semi-independent basis to government bodies, particularly the Minis-
try of Information (Harrisson 1976, 12; Hinton 2013).  
Mass-Observation approached football as one element of its more general 
concern with the leisure pursuits of ordinary people. Football featured promi-
nently as part of its investigation of war’s impact on sport during the first six 
months of the conflict. Observers visited a handful of matches, spoke to club 
officials and reported conversations with, and overhead conversations between, 
spectators and followers of the game. In April 1940, and again in March and 
April 1941, Mass-Observation also interviewed members of the public on their 
attitude to their favourite sports and sports news. A year later, in reaction to 
Cripps’ criticisms of some sports in the House of Commons, a question on the 
topic was included as a directive to the national panel.37 Some of this material 
was written up and incorporated into file reports or published in other forms. 
But the bulk of it has been surprisingly underutilised both by historians of the 
home front and experts on British leisure and sport.  
Much of this writing positioned football very precisely in terms of social 
class and status vis-à-vis other sports and forms of entertainment. We have 
little detailed evidence of how the composition of the football crowd changed 
during wartime. A description of an Arsenal-Crystal Palace match from No-
vember 1939 noted that the majority of those present were connoisseurs of the 
game and dedicated fans of the home team but made only one explicit refer-
ence to class when it quoted the comments of ‘a working class man.’38 Similar-
                                                             
37  M-O Bulletin for March 1942, FR 1126, undated [March 1942], M-O A.  
38  Typescript description of football match (Arsenal v Crystal Palace at White Hart Lane) (4 
November 1939), TC, 82/2/E, M-O A. 
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ly, an amateur game at Golder’s Green from the same period was apparently 
populated by ‘experts’ and ‘die-hards,’ almost all of whom were male and 
many of whom the observer categorised as belonging to Mass-Observation’s 
‘C’ grouping, meaning artisans and skilled workers.39 Even in the ‘expensive 
seats,’ from which Cranston watched the 1942 England-Scotland fixture, ‘the 
obviously more prosperous working people’ were included among the mixed 
group described.40 Similar accounts of greyhound meetings, by comparison, 
made more explicit reference to social class. At Wembley in May 1940 there 
were ‘working class everywhere’ and over three-quarters of the crowd counted 
at the Walthamstow, New Cross and White City greyhound stadiums in Lon-
don in February 1942 were ‘working-class people.’41 In his personal response 
to Cripps’ speech, Harrisson argued that the public attacks ‘from MPs and 
others in the high income levels’ on greyhound racing and boxing were ex-
plained by the ‘predominantly working-class appeal’ of these sports, ‘an appeal 
especially to male physical workers with limited leisure opportunities.’ Foot-
ball, by contrast, which Harrisson noted had recently been given ‘the powerful 
sanction’ of the attendance of the Prime Minister Winston Churchill, was left 
comparatively untouched. The implication was that, though recognised as a 
working-class sport, football had a higher cultural status as the chosen sport of 
‘productive’ industrial workers and not the ‘slackers,’ ‘dodgers’ and ‘parasites’ 
sometimes erroneously associated with the dog track.42  
The responses to the March 1942 directive tended to locate football, in a simi-
lar way, as the working-class sport most accepted by other social groups. Panel-
lists were asked their views on whether ‘big sporting events’ should continue in 
wartime. In its summary of the findings, Mass-Observation identified football as 
receiving the highest ‘approval’ rating – that is, the sport that respondents men-
tioned specifically should continue. It was also a long way behind the other popu-
lar spectator sports, horse racing and greyhound racing, in terms of disapproval. 
‘Many people feel,’ it was concluded, ‘that football should continue,’ as ‘a means 
of relaxation for thousands.’ Even those who wanted sporting events to be re-
stricted further, it was noted, tended to think differently about professional foot-
ball, due to this assumed role as ‘a vital mass-relaxation.’43 
                                                             
39  Typescript description of match (Golders Green v Enfield); Interview with the Golder’s Green 
secretary (11 November 1939), TC, 82/2/E, M-O A. 
40  Manuscript description of Scotland v England at Wembley (17 January 1942), TC, 82/2/E, M-O A. 
41  A Greyhound Meeting at Wembley Stadium on a Saturday Afternoon during the 9th Month 
of the War (May 1940), TC, 86/1/D, M-O A; Some Thoughts on Greyhounds and National 
Unity, FR 1149 (10 March 1942), M-O A, 7.  
42  Some Thoughts on Greyhounds and National Unity, FR 1149 (10 March 1942), M-O A, 4, 6, 
summary. 
43  Report on Attitudes to the Continuance of Organised Sport in Wartime, FR 1229, M-O A, 2, 
3, 7.  
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If we delve further into the individual responses, we can see more clearly 
the interplay between class, cultural distinction and the nation in the way in 
which football was discussed. Mass-Observation’s national panel was far from 
representative of British society more generally. Only a small percentage 
(around 19 per cent in 1939) identified themselves as working class, at a time 
when the manual working class made up around three-quarters of the popula-
tion (Hinton 2008, 210-1). The majority saw themselves as occupying a posi-
tion somewhere in the middle classes. Geographically, there was a bias towards 
the south of England and many panellists identified with the political left. Mike 
Savage has argued that rather than reading the panel as ‘some kind of repre-
sentative sample,’ historians ought to recognise its distinctiveness as an intel-
lectual, literate and relatively affluent group; or a ‘cultural movement of the 
educated middle class’ (Savage 2008, 459). They have also been seen as writ-
ers with a ‘heightened social awareness’ and ‘a perception of their separateness 
from other parts of society’ (Courage 2007). For Savage, one of the most dis-
tinctive features of the writing of respondents was their attempt to distance 
themselves both from the working class and ‘the staid, non-intellectual mem-
bers of the middle class.’ The working class, he suggests, are often referred to 
but rarely discussed with any detail or with particular knowledge or interest. 
They appear in this writing as a ‘default’ class, a group whose cultural traits 
and activities ‘need no specific elucidation,’ existing outside the cultural world 
of the Mass Observer (Savage 2008, 457, 463, 466).  
The treatment of football in the 1942 directive replies tallies in many re-
spects with Savage’s more general observations. Many respondents certainly 
did offer their approval, though often partial and qualified, for the continuation 
of football in wartime. In doing so, however, they often staked out their cultural 
distance and intellectual difference from those they considered the game was 
really for. Even the relatively small proportion of Mass Observers who admit-
ted to having been football fans in the past were normally quick to point out 
that they were no longer able, but more importantly that they did not now need, 
to attend games. One respondent who had attended matches about once a 
month pre-war admitted that he now had far less time, and worked Saturday 
afternoons, in addition ‘to the natural feeling of its comparative unim-
portance.’44 Those who had the time to watch football still often chose a differ-
ent pastime in the context of war. A female observer confessed to having re-
placed her weekly football with the cinema, as a more appropriate means of 
‘rest’ and recuperation.45 ‘Instead of watching Hartlepools United,’ another 
respondent commented, ‘I am now secretary of a Church League Club.’46  
                                                             
44  Directive Respondent (DR) 2804, March 1942 Directive, M-O A.  
45  DR 2252, March 1942 Directive. 
46  DR 2656, March 1942 Directive. 
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Invariably when mention was made of football’s value as relaxation and es-
capism, it was in relation to the working class rather than the Observer’s own 
social group. For this class of people, it was not just an enjoyable diversion but 
a vital means of recuperation, some respondents maintained. A London-based 
male considered football ‘a fairly “necessary” sport’; another suggested that 
there were large sections of the population for whom ‘such things are almost 
the breath of life.’47 Many pointed out the limited recreational outlets for male 
industrial workers. ‘Although this is not my idea of relaxation,’ one female 
Observer noted, ‘it is unfair to expect these people to change their methods of 
enjoying themselves when they are doing war work.’48 Favourable comparisons 
were often made with alternative forms of amusement. A male respondent, for 
instance, claimed that the ‘workers of this country’ were ‘much more interested 
in soccer and boxing than in crooners.’49 But it was the comparison with horse 
racing and greyhound racing which recurred most often in the panellists’ re-
plies.50 As an entertainment synonymous with the skilled worker who formed the 
backbone of the nation’s war effort, football’s symbolic and functional roles were 
regularly applauded. While the working population would ‘feel the loss’ of a 
football match very much, one respondent claimed, horse racing by comparison 
could easily be dispensed with, as it was allegedly patronised by ‘people who 
have nothing to do, and plenty of money to do it with.’51 Those who gave football 
their approval thus did so both positively and negatively; identifying it as a vital 
form of recreation for the productive working classes who needed it, and as a 
more tolerable symbol of the working nation at play than the morally dubious 
gambling sports of the unskilled worker and the idle rich.  
Not all respondents, however, saw football as a distant component of ‘sepa-
rate, mostly self-enclosed’ working-class lives (Field 2013, 236). A number 
expressed the view that wartime circumstances, especially the importance of 
war production, meant that the provision of class-based recreations were now 
national concerns. Working-class culture had effectively become nationalised. 
One male respondent focused on the ‘national’ importance of games like foot-
ball in maintaining the confidence of the people. ‘If “morale” is to be kept up,’ 
he commented, ‘surely the nation should be allowed to enjoy the sporting 
events it has hitherto taken for granted.’52 Others talked of major sporting 
events as national ‘traditions,’ locating them among the many familiar markers 
of Britishness, as one of the ‘things we are fighting for.’53 Nor did some re-
spondents regard it as contradictory to claim football for both the working class 
                                                             
47  DRs 3081, 3061, March 1942 Directive.  
48  DR 3027, March 1942 Directive. 
49  DR 1264, March 1942 Directive. 
50  See DRs 1325, 2156, 2315, 1313, 2970, March 1942 Directive.  
51  DR 2751, March 1942 Directive. 
52  DR 2941, March 1942 Directive. 
53  DR 3073, March 1942 Directive. 
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and the nation. As well as advocating ‘the Cup Final’ alongside the Derby and 
Wimbledon as a key signifier of English nationhood, one Observer stressed the 
importance of sports like football as an ‘invaluable’ safety valve for a nation at 
war. ‘[W]hat does a hard working factory hand more good than seeing a hearty 
game of football,’ he asked rhetorically: ‘It’s something in the crowd and the 
smell – something called life.’54 
4.  Region and Nation 
Historians have only just begun to think seriously about the complex geogra-
phies of the British wartime ‘nation.’ For good reason, a great deal of attention 
has been paid to the divide between the city and countryside, and the compet-
ing claims of both to represent Britain. Lucy Noakes, for instance, has demon-
strated that for the very same group whose feelings about football we have just 
considered, Mass-Observation’s volunteer panel, the ‘nation’ to which they 
attached themselves emotionally was a specific one, defined more than any-
thing else in terms of the rural landscape of the south of England (Noakes 
2015). In this section, we are less interested in the city-countryside dichotomy 
than the way in which the relationship between ideas of region and nation on 
one hand, and the tensions between Britain’s four distinctive national cultures 
on the other, were played out in the context of wartime football. The argument 
here is that far from being painted over in a unifying national coat, regional and 
sub-national structures and loyalties remained important and indeed were in-
creasingly highlighted in the wartime game. The emphasis on local, regional 
and distinct national footballing identities did not mean, however, that the 
Britishness of football (an identification insufficiently acknowledged by histo-
rians of the game) was necessarily rejected (Taylor 2008, 11-3). As in other 
arenas of political and cultural life, regionalism in football was energised by 
the desire to be recognised as an essential part of the nation.  
Wartime football accentuated many of the regional tensions which had long 
affected the organisation of the game. Dave Russell has noted that ‘arguments 
within sports were inevitably overlain with a powerful spatial dimension’ and 
this was particularly true of football (Russell 2004, 251). The London-based 
FA had been a target for criticism outside the capital for many years, especially 
in the north of England, where the professional game developed first and from 
where the majority of pre-war league champions and cup winners had come. 
Perceptions of favouritism to southern players and clubs, and the privileged 
status of Wembley as the home of the FA Cup final and of England-Scotland 
internationals, both particularly piqued the northern football world. The FA’s 
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main rival for control of the elite game was the Football League, an 88-club 
nationwide professional competition at the beginning of the war, with its head-
quarters in Preston in Lancashire. The tensions between the two bodies, bub-
bling gently throughout the interwar years, were not primarily about geogra-
phy, though it is certainly evident that the Football League saw itself as a 
‘provincial counterweight […] to metropolitan ambition’ (Russell 2004, 250). 
If anything, the war helped to improve cooperation between the two, although 
they maintained distinct spheres of responsibility. In 1945, some of the 
League’s southern-based clubs pushed to have its offices moved from Lanca-
shire to London so that it could be kept ‘in closer touch with important gov-
ernment departments’ but the predominantly northern and midlands-based 
lawyers and small businessmen on the Management Committee stymied the 
proposal (Inglis 1988, 170). 
The main wartime conflicts in the elite game emerged from the new competi-
tive structures based on regional divisions. The creation in 1941 of Scotland’s 
North-Eastern League (NEL), consisting of clubs from Aberdeen, Fife and Edin-
burgh previously denied organised football, had generated considerable resent-
ment from the larger, established Scottish Southern League (SSL). When Rangers 
agreed to play its second team in the new competition, the SSL retaliated by 
threatening to ban the Glasgow club’s players from competing in two competi-
tions. The new league’s representatives challenged the ‘utter selfishness’ of the 
SSL motion, while the Daily Record described it as a ‘stupid decision’ by the 
clubs in the south, who had done ‘a lot of damage to their country cousins’ by 
disbanding the Scottish Football League in the first place.55 Backed by the 
Scottish FA, the NEL pressed on and the SSL backed down.56 But conflict 
erupted again the following spring when the SSL voted to exclude the NEL 
clubs from its successful Summer Cup competition, supposedly on the grounds 
of travel difficulties and the fact that the weaker NEL clubs would fail to attract 
large gates. They also clearly resented Rangers being given a second ‘bite at the 
cherry’ with its two teams (Crampsey 1991, 120), a fact the NEL recognised 
when it refused to ‘accept as sincere the reason given’ for excluding the northern 
clubs and bemoaned the ‘unsportsmanlike and unfriendly attitude’ of the south-
erners.57 
The main fracture in English football’s administrative structure involved 
London’s professional clubs. Conscious of the precedent set during the First 
World War, when they had run a competition independent of Football League 
control, the London clubs, led by Tottenham Hotspur, had in July 1940 at-
tempted unsuccessfully to wrest administrative control over the regional sec-
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tions from the Football League Management Committee (FLMC).58 Disagree-
ments continued into the following spring, when the London clubs organised 
their own cup competition in spite of the opposition of the FLMC.59 When the 
FLMC plans for its regional groupings for 1941/42 were announced in June, 
the London representatives complained that too much travelling would be 
involved, and voted to break away from the Football League and form their 
own London War League.60 Significantly, they stressed the fit between their 
plans and the national war effort. Long-distance games, it was argued would 
involve players ‘absenting themselves from work of national importance’ and 
the London clubs ‘refuse[d] to be identified with such unpatriotic behaviour.’ 
Supporters of the London group claimed that its league involved 3,000 miles of 
travel, compared with 9,000 miles under the Football League scheme.61 The 
FLMC reacted by cancelling the League membership of the capital’s eleven 
rebel clubs and of four associates in the south. They were soon joined by 
Portsmouth, who were forced to sign up to the rebel competition to save their 
fixtures.62 The London clubs held out until December 1941, when the FLMC 
agreed to a compromise whereby League membership would be restored in 
return for nominal fines and what Simon Inglis (1988, 167) termed ‘an agreed 
statement of regret.’63 But the rebels’ point had been reluctantly accepted by 
the Football League, their London-based league plan remaining in place, with 
the addition of just two clubs, for the rest of the war. 
The interplay between local and national was an important element of foot-
ball’s popular appeal. The regional wartime game, however, offered no nation-
al stage upon which teams could project a sense of civic pride and belonging. It 
offered up more local confrontations, but these were shorn of the wider com-
petitive context in which victory was noticed by newspapers beyond the locali-
ty and the region. It also often denied supporters the opportunity of confront-
ing, and sometimes humiliating, an unpopular (and invariably successful) 
‘other’ from a different region: one of the Glasgow ‘Old Firm’ in the east or 
north of Scotland or ‘lucky’ Arsenal in the north of England. The use of guest 
players, a necessary measure given the frequent mobility of service personnel 
and war workers, was a particularly controversial feature. Some clubs made 
extensive use of ‘guests’: Notts County reportedly faced a Sheffield United 
team with no less than ten in March 1943.64 And the letters contained in Wal-
sall FC’s Players’ Registration Book demonstrate the importance of guests at a 
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time when the availability of players was so unpredictable.65 For some, the 
difficulties of maintaining interest in teams that were less rooted or connected 
to the locality than in peacetime summed up the inadequacies of wartime foot-
ball. One Mass-Observation interviewee described regional football in Novem-
ber 1939 as ‘a mess. There is no league. Nothing we are used to.’66 A subse-
quent report felt that the ‘free borrowing’ of players had ‘annoyed real 
supporters’ and ‘killed much of the incentive to go and see “my team.”’67  
The tension between regional and national dimensions of football was re-
flected in the way in which the game was represented by radio broadcasting. 
Historians of the BBC have noted that the suspension of the separate regional 
networks for the duration of the war did not signal the end of regional pro-
gramming. According to Thomas Hajkowski, the continuation of ‘regionally 
flavored programs’ [sic.] allowed the BBC to recognise ‘the national diversity 
of Britain’ within the context of an emphasis on national unity (Hajkowski 
2010, 121). This was certainly evident in the broadcasting of football, which 
played a small but not insignificant part in the wartime BBC becoming more 
generally ‘responsive to listeners’ tastes’ (Nicholas 1999, 63). The BBC in-
tended its football broadcasts to be spread ‘as widely as is practicable’ over the 
different regions covered by the new wartime competitions. This was achieved 
partly by ensuring that each of the main regions was represented in the match 
commentaries that were broadcast as part of the Forces Programme and in other 
programming.68 In the schedule for October and November 1940, for instance, 
three games from the North Region were featured, with two from London and 
one each from Wales and the Midlands. The fifteen match January-May 1945 
schedule included six from the North, four from London, two each from the 
Midlands and Scotland and one from Wales.69 The disproportionate focus on 
the north was considered by programme planners as an accurate reflection of 
the cultural importance of football in that region. Northern representatives 
reminded Head Office in January 1940 that ‘the North’ had more senior foot-
ball clubs than the other English and Welsh regions put together and that ‘a 
great many’ professionals playing for non-northern clubs ‘were bred in the 
mining districts of the North and exported later.’ For this reason, it hoped that 
the ‘angle’ of any future broadcasting would not be ‘unduly metropolitan.’70 
There were some accusations of southern bias, such as the fact that the results 
                                                             
65  Walsall FC Players’ Registration Book, including wartime letters, Walsall Record Office, 
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of southern fixtures were read out in sports bulletins before those of the north.71 
However, the BBC’s emphasis on major representative matches with a poten-
tial national and international audience – full internationals, inter-service clash-
es, and other games which normally included players from a range of regions 
and clubs across the UK – was an astute way of ensuring that regional attach-
ments could be flagged up alongside national loyalties.72  
As in the case of regional identification, football provided a platform upon 
which the particularities of the UK’s four nations could be conveyed in combi-
nation with expressions of national unity. Scotland offers perhaps the best exam-
ple, and is the case we will focus on briefly here. With separate administrative 
structures and a particular cultural attachment to the game which had no genuine 
rival among its British neighbours, the leaders of Scottish football had a legiti-
mate claim to be treated independently by the wartime government. This was 
certainly a concern for English administrators such as Rous, who urged the 
Home Office as early as September 1939 not to allow Scottish exceptions to 
British rules.73 The government resisted the Scottish FA’s lobbying to have 
higher maximum attendances in its evacuation areas, especially Glasgow, alt-
hough greater ad hoc maxima were, as we have seen, accepted more readily by 
local Chief Constables in Scotland than in England. Distanced from the worst 
of wartime bombing, Scottish football followers had always been less accept-
ing of the attendance and travel restrictions: George Graham, the secretary of 
the Scottish FA, admitted in 1942 that government measures were ‘not popular 
in Scotland.’74 One issue which the Scottish football authorities pressed consist-
ently throughout the war was the loosening of restrictions on mid-week matches. 
In August 1942, the Scottish FA, under pressure from its semi-professional junior 
clubs, persuaded the Home Office to allow ‘as a working rule’ midweek matches 
with attendances below 2,000 in Scotland specifically.75 Attempts to get the ban 
lifted for senior clubs were rejected by the government on a number of occasions, 
however.76 In its 1942/43 annual report, the Scottish FA criticised the restrictions 
openly, noting that the transport, equipment and manpower difficulties of contin-
uing to play had increased during the course of the war and hoping that ‘greater 
consideration will be shown’ by the government in future ‘towards [the clubs] in 
their efforts to carry on good, clean, sport.’77 
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England-Scotland international matches were particularly fruitful sites for 
the articulation of national sentiment. They had become the showpiece of the 
football season between the wars, especially in Scotland, acquiring particular 
symbolic meaning for a smaller and less powerful nation that regularly 
punched above its weight on the pitch. These matches were more frequent in 
wartime but the Scots became less successful. Of the fifteen fixtures organised 
between December 1939 and April 1945, Scotland won only two and drew two, 
scoring 20 goals against England’s 53. England’s 8-0 ‘massacre’ of Scotland in 
Manchester in October 1943, in particular, was considered by the Scottish press 
a ‘blow to our pride in the prowess of our footballers.’78 There was even re-
portedly ‘a strong feeling’ in Scotland that the next encounter at Wembley 
should be cancelled due to the weakness of the Scottish eleven.79 Apologists in 
Scotland bemoaned the fact that the existence of fewer reserved occupations 
and the greater number of Scots in the forces had left English football ‘in a 
relatively much stronger position.’80 
The football authorities and many football followers in Scotland were par-
ticularly suspicious of the BBC. This was partly explained by a general mis-
trust of sports broadcasting but also by the feeling that the London-based Cor-
poration was not always even-handed in its treatment of football across Britain. 
Commentaries of international matches were a particular point of conflict. For 
instance, the Scottish FA responded angrily in April 1944 to the remarks of the 
London-based commentator, Raymond Glendenning, who they argued had 
exaggerated the foul play of the Scottish team and minimised that of the Eng-
lish during the coverage of an international at Hampden Park. He had criticised 
the referee for not awarding a penalty to England and, a BBC official noted, 
had also referred to the England team as ‘we,’ a common complaint that partic-
ularly irritated Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish listeners.81 A listener from 
Montrose outlined what he considered to be Glendenning’s long-standing 
‘prejudice’ against Scots, suggesting that he should not be allowed to return to 
Scotland ‘as commentator of anything.’82 The Outside Broadcast team consult-
ed the FA’s Stanley Rous, who thought that Glendenning had actually got it 
right as the referee was ‘shockingly biased in favour of the home team,’ though 
the Scottish press, perhaps not surprisingly, disagreed. The Director of Outside 
Broadcasting, Michael Standing, concluded that Glendenning should have been 
‘more restrained in his observations’ and, though trivial in one sense, the Scot-
tish BBC Programme Director agreed that it was crucial to avoid anything that 
                                                             
78  Daily Herald (18 October 1943); Falkirk Herald (20 October 1943). 
79  Newspaper clipping, undated [February 1944], BBC WAC, R30/3578/1. 
80  Andrew Stewart to Standing (12 May 1944), BBC WAC, R30/993/1. 
81  Stewart to Standing (26 April 1944); Standing to Stewart (9 May 1944), BBC WAC, 
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would arouse ‘bad blood between England and Scotland’ at the present time.83 
However, while they considered alternative commentators, particularly Scots-
men and those who had ‘good will in Scottish football circles – where that 
commodity is scarce as far as we are concerned,’ they ultimately persisted with 
Glendenning, valuing his experience and trusting that there would be no further 
slips in his impartiality.84  
It would be wrong to assume, however, that international representative 
matches meant the same things in war as they did in peace. The press and the 
radio constantly flagged up the abnormality of these occasions: ‘it was a strangely 
unfamiliar International Day in Glasgow,’ the Glasgow Herald noted in May 
1940.85 Symbols of wartime unity – allied flags, the presence of wartime lead-
ers such as Churchill and General Montgomery, soldiers and sailors sporting 
the colours of both countries, and so on – existed side-by-side with the wearing 
of patriotic favours such as the thistle, white heather, tartan and the white rose 
and the continued impact of the ‘Hampden Roar,’ possibly the best known 
characteristic of the distinctiveness of Scottish football culture. In both Scot-
land and England, the press regularly spoke of such matches in terms of the 
continuing health of British football.86 For the government, international repre-
sentative matches powerfully represented a nation united in play, symbolised, 
as Glasgow’s Sunday Post observed in 1944, by Union Jacks flying ‘impartial-
ly’ over the ground.87  
5.  Football Memories and War 
Most wartime studies of cultural institutions turn at some point to look at the 
effect of the war on the structures that governed them and the form and content 
of the activity itself. Plans for post-war reconstruction were often central to 
this, and certainly football’s governing bodies spent considerable time and 
energy discussing plans for transforming the game in areas such as coaching, 
international relations and youth football.88 However, while there is no denying 
the importance of such plans, it is contended here that too much looking for-
ward to ‘post-war’ among scholars has led them to neglect continuities with the 
pre-war period, characterised most powerfully by the wartime focus on memo-
ries and reminiscences (Baker 1999, 135-40; Holt and Mason 2000, 19-35). 
                                                             
83  Standing to Stewart (9 May 1944); Stewart to Standing (12 May 1944), BBC WAC, 
R30/993/1. 
84  Stewart to Standing (17 March 1942); Standing to Stewart (23 September 1944), BBC WAC, 
R30/993/1. 
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86  See Glasgow Herald (19 January 1942). 
87  Sunday Post (Glasgow) (23 April 1944). 
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Like certain wartime cinema audiences, many football followers seem to have 
been most comfortable with representations of the game which dwelt on its histo-
ry, and on residual elements of interwar football culture (Harper 1997, 165-6).  
The emphasis on representations of football’s past in the press and radio 
broadcasting were dictated in many respects by the practical limitations of 
wartime football, particularly the shortage of matches and their ad hoc organi-
sation. Even though most national and local newspapers, for instance, devoted 
considerably less space to sport than they had before the war, there was propor-
tionately even less football news, analysis and gossip to fill it with.89 The ten-
dency became particularly marked during the autumn and winter of 1940-41, 
when there were relatively few competitive matches, and the national Sunday 
press, in particular, began to print various columns on reminiscences of major 
sporting events.90 The local press followed suit. The Burnley Express ‘Down 
Memory Lane’ series, for instance, included the occasional football subject.91 
Memories of former players, officials and teams featured heavily in the col-
umns of a number of sports journalists, sometimes starting a dialogue with 
readers through the letters page. ‘Sportsman’s’ lengthy recollections, across 
four columns, on games of the past disrupted by severe weather in the Burnley 
Express in January 1940, for example, received a response from ‘Old Timer.’ 
‘What a grand antidote,’ he/ she wrote, ‘to the blackout and all the horrors and 
anxieties of this war business just to sit by the fire and for a few precious mo-
ments recall the glories that were ours in the good old days.’92 A similar re-
sponse to a radio talk by the football referee J. A. Wiltshire came from a listen-
er in the navy: ‘It came as a change to hear someone referring to memories of 
happier times instead of the usual war talk bunk we get seven days a week.’ He 
urged the BBC to broadcast more such talks as they would ‘go a very long way 
to relieving the monotony of our various jobs.’93 
Reactions of this type led the BBC to develop a number of series ‘of retro-
spective sports features,’ which became a characteristic of wartime sports 
broadcasting.94 The first of these, The Crowd Roared, a series of 15-minute 
programmes based on events over the previous decade (the 4 April 1941 pro-
gramme was titled ‘Soccer Cup Finals, 1936/9’), started in early March 1941.95 
It drew good listening figures, at around 8.0 per cent to 11.1 per cent for its 
Friday, 6.30-6.45pm slot, in its first month (the ‘Cup Finals’ programme at-
tracted 10.0 per cent). This was a higher percentage than listened to the vast 
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majority of match commentaries.96 The two longest-running series were Giants 
of Sport (September 1941-July 1943) and Sportsmen’s Corner (July 1943-May 
1945). The latter was intended to link ‘topical and reminiscent items of national 
interest’ and to ‘bring to the microphone’ sports stars to give ‘their personal 
experiences, both past and present.’97 This could prove troublesome, as oc-
curred in November 1943 when a programme was devoted to the former Bristol 
City and England defender Billy Wedlock. By then in his sixties, Wedlock had 
spoken well when first meeting the BBC West producer ‘among his football 
friends,’ but due to nerves he became ‘almost unintelligible on the microphone’ 
during the recording.98 Other contributors, however, such as the Arsenal man-
ager and commentator George Allison, were already well known radio person-
alities, and the presenters, particularly Glendenning, Leo Hunter and Victor 
Smythe, ensured that there was a familiar continuity between the BBC’s treat-
ment of wartime football and its ruminations on the pre-war game.  
By the summer of 1944, Sportsmen’s Corner had become dominated by nar-
rower topics, such as talks on the history of famous clubs. A request was put 
out for programme ideas in early 1945 but these, too, tended to reflect local or 
regional interests rather than national perspectives.99 BBC Scotland and BBC 
North complained about the poor representation of their regions (‘75% London 
area interest’ according to North Region), but Standing replied that most of the 
London-based programmes were actually ‘of a national character.’100 By May 
1945, however, Standing had recognised that the material was running dry and 
that, more importantly, the time had come ‘to give our full attention to current 
rather than past sporting events.’101 Remembering the past as a strategy for 
getting through the present was no longer essential with victory and the end of 
the war imminent. 
6.  Conclusion  
Selina Todd has recently argued for the Second World War to be seen as a key 
turning point in British class relations. While working people came to see 
themselves as ‘a collective force’ bound together by new shared experiences 
and needs, the government and the media portrayed them for the first time as 
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‘the backbone of the nation,’ a group whose interests were now ‘synonymous 
with those of the country.’ This did not mean, of course, that Britain became a 
classless society or that there was any genuine attempt to ensure equality of 
sacrifice. Rather, as Todd and other scholars have persuasively argued, class and 
nation emerged as complementary rather than contradictory categories (Todd 
2014, 120-1). As Field has noted, ‘discourses about class imply claims about its 
place in the nation’; both are, he suggests, ‘interdependent and reciprocally con-
structed’ (Field 2011, 377). Already a sport of the working class but increasingly 
portrayed in war as belonging to the nation too, football was one cultural form 
which exemplified the complex, and sometimes incongruous, impulses inherent 
within the project of the ‘people’s war.’ The story of what happened to the 
game during the conflict, and the discourses that surrounded it, offer new an-
gles from which to view the multiple dimensions of the British wartime nation.  
That histories of wartime Britain have had little to say about football is in 
certain respects unsurprising. Always regarded as a marginal, if not trivial, 
topic by the more conservative-minded scholar, football could appear to have 
been of even less significance between 1939 and 1945. In the abnormal cir-
cumstances of war, football was forced to adapt if it wanted to continue. It 
modified and revised its structures, and in some cases gave up its facilities to 
the military and Civil Defence authorities. National leagues and cups became 
regional, crowd size was restricted and the press were urged to avoiding build-
ing up interest in forthcoming fixtures. Football was still played, watched and 
written about. But many observers thought that much of what attracted supporters 
and followers to the game, its essence and its character, as well as its weekly and 
seasonal routine and rhythm, had been lost under wartime conditions. The temp-
tation has therefore been to analyse football, and other sports, only in terms of 
what was lost, as a ‘casualty’ of the war (Field 2011, 223). This is a mistake, 
however, because it fails to recognise that continuities did remain, that new rou-
tines and rhythms could be established as the war proceeded, and, above all, 
that football could be powerfully represented by the media, and imagined by 
the population, even when games were less frequent and may have seemed less 
important. If wartime football was more low-key than in peacetime that does 
not mean that it was without significance and meaning for those who played 
and watched. To continue, to carry on, could be interpreted as a significant act, 
demonstrating commitment to one’s team, perhaps, but also loyalty to one’s 
class, locality or nation, depending on the situation and the context.  
Like many other aspects of wartime life, football was more closely connect-
ed to the state than it had been before. From the beginning of the war, morale 
was a watchword of political and popular discussion. It was an issue that the 
government took extremely seriously and for which they planned meticulously. 
Ensuring a positive outlook on the home front was a priority as it was felt that 
low morale could affect war production and, in a worst case scenario, necessi-
tate the bringing in of troops to subdue a population wracked by fear, panic and 
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lawlessness. Maintaining and monitoring morale became primary aims of a 
number of government departments and agencies. And once it was agreed that 
entertainment and sport were vital to help workers recuperate and to relieve 
boredom, it was always likely that football, widely and accurately considered 
the most popular sport among war workers, would be brought into the govern-
ment fold. Football’s importance as a provider of morale connected Stanley 
Rous and other important administrators tightly with policy makers and offi-
cials in Whitehall. Fixture lists were scrutinised each year, and match attend-
ances monitored regularly to ensure crowds were high enough to guarantee a 
reasonable spectacle but not so high as to represent a safety risk or to signal a 
return to sporting normality. As we have seen, the war turned football into a 
political issue, and into a matter of national significance. Politicians defended it 
as a recreation of the ordinary worker, as they had before, but in wartime they 
also celebrated its value as a national game, helping to sustain a population 
under strain and stress.  
The relationship between ideas of nation, region and class in football tell us 
much about what has recently been termed the ‘negotiation’ of identities in war-
time Britain (Ugolini and Pattinson 2015). Football was remarkably malleable in 
the way it could illuminate different attachments and loyalties. To paraphrase 
Eric Hobsbawm, the ‘eleven named people’ in wartime football teams could 
embody various ‘imagined communities,’ often at the same time (Hobsbawm 
1990, 143). Regional leagues and ‘guest’ players complicated the game’s estab-
lished geographical certainties. Clubs drifted in and out of competitions accord-
ing to wider circumstances, further upsetting the reliability of long-standing 
allegiances between the supporter and his or her team. And the simple ‘us’ and 
‘them’ of international football encounters was more likely to also simultane-
ously illuminate the ‘we’ of the British nation than before or after the war. It 
was perfectly possible to see representative games as occasions where national 
honour was at stake for the two sides and to approach the event itself as a rep-
resentation of British wartime unity. Above all, we have seen that if football 
was acknowledged before 1939 as a people’s sport, the war allowed it to be 
embraced more readily as a national game, albeit still one with a heavy work-
ing-class accent. Football was certainly a more important symbol of British 
nationhood in wartime than had previously been thought, although its Britain 
was still predominantly male, industrial and working class.  
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